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Abstract
We present a probabilistic model of an intrusion in a renewal process. Given a
process and a sequence of events, an intrusion is a subsequence of events that is
not produced by the process. Applications of the model are, for example, online
payment fraud with the fraudster taking over a user’s account and performing
payments on the user’s behalf, or unexpected equipment failures due to unintended
use.
We adopt Bayesian approach to infer the probability of an intrusion in a se-
quence of events, a MAP subsequence of events constituting the intrusion, and the
marginal probability of each event in a sequence to belong to the intrusion. We
evaluate the model for intrusion detection on synthetic data and on anonymized
data from an online payment system.
1 Overview
We approach the problem of distinguishing between ‘native’ events and intrusions in an event stream
arriving over time. This problem arises in multiple applications. Consider, for example, an online
payment service where the users connect with their credentials and pay for goods or services. A
thief can illegally obtain access to another user’s account and steal money by sending payments on
behalf of the legitimate user. Is there a way to identify illegal payments by looking at a sequence of
payments even if each individual payment looks legitimate?
We turn to the renewal process as the basis for the probabilistic generative model of the problem.
Renewal processes [5] are used to model arrival of events where hold times between events are
independently distributed. We assume that regular events come from a renewal process with known
parameters, which can be given or inferred. We then consider a sequence of recent events and reason
about the likelihood that some of the events are ‘foreign’ rather than belong to the process. We adopt
the Bayesian approach to infer the probability of an intrusion in a given event sequence, a maximum
a posteriori probability (MAP) subsequence of events constituting the intrusion, and the marginal
probability of each event to belong to the intrusion.
We show that the inference can be performed in polynomial time. We implement the inference
algorithms and evaluate the inference on synthetic data and on anonymized data from an online
payment system.
Contributions
The paper brings the following contributions:
• A probabilistic generative model for inference about intrusions in renewal processes.
• Polynomial-time algorithms for computing the probability of an intrusion, a MAP subse-
quence of events constituting the intrusion, and the marginal probability of each event to
belong to the intrusion.
• An evaluation of applicability of the algorithms to intrusion detection in online payment
systems.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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2 Related Work
The problem of detecting an intrusion in a sequence of events belongs to the field of anomaly (or
novelty) detection. An extensive review of novelty detection in general is provided in [11, 14].
Anomaly detection in discrete sequences is reviewed in [2], and in temporal data in [8].
A generative probabilistic model [6] is used to reason about intrusion probabilities. Much of the
recent fundamental and applied research on unsupervised learning in general and anomaly detection
in particular involves generative probabilistic models [15, 13, 23, 22].
A renewal process is a discrete stochastic process [7]. Discrete stochastic processes arise as models
in many applications [16, 7, 18]. Depending on the nature of the phenomenon being modelled, dif-
ferent discrete stochastic processes are used, such as Poisson processes [10, 17], Cox processes [9],
interacting point processes and in particular Hawkes processes [12, 3], Markov processes [24], and
other variations [20, 19].
The present work differs from earlier research in the following aspects:
a) A specific type of novelty, namely an intrusion, is considered. The sequence of events is viewed
as a mixture of normal activity and an intrusion.
b) The generative model is used to predict both the probability of an intrusion and the marginal
probability of each event to belong to the intrusion (rather than just the probability of an intru-
sion).
c) No prior assumption is made about the stochastic process realised by the intrusion.
3 Preliminaries
A renewal process [5][7, Chapter 5] is a generalization of the Poisson point process. In a renewal
process, the interarrival intervals ∆t are non-negative, independent, and identically distributed ran-
dom variables. A renewal process can be characterized in several ways — by the distributions of
either arrival times, interarrival intervals, or the number of arrivals during a unit time interval. In
this paper, we characterize renewal processes by the distribution of interarrival intervals. We write
∆t ∼ F (θF ) (1)
to describe a renewal process with interarrival intervals drawn from distribution F with parameter
θF . For example, the Poisson process is a renewal process with exponentially distributed interarrival
intervals:
∆tPoisson ∼ Exponential(λ) (2)
Renewal processes are used as a simple model for systems that repeatedly return to a state proba-
bilistically equivalent to the initial state.
4 Probabilistic Generative Model of Intrusion
In the problem of intrusion detection in a renewal process we are given:
• A renewal process
∆t ∼ F (θF )
• A prior probability p that an individual event in the sequence belongs to the intrusion.
• A time interval [ts, te], of duration T = te − ts.
• A sequence S of N events {t1, t2, . . . , tN} within the time interval, i.e. ts ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤
· · · ≤ tN ≤ te.
Based on this, we need to determine:
1. The posterior probability of an intrusion in the sequence.
2. Maximum a posteriori subsequence IMAP of events constituting the intrusion.
3. The marginal probability of each event to belong to the intrusion.
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To solve the problem, we construct a generative model that produces a sequence of events, taking the
possibility of an intrusion into account, and then perform posterior inference on the model. There
are two essential observations [5]:
1. A renewal process is infinite in both directions.
2. The probability density of the interarrival interval of a renewal process is fully determined
by the time interval passed from the last event.
Based on these observations, just two more events — t0 and before the first event and tN+1 after
the last event in the sequence — fully define the context of the given sequence of events; also, the
times can be shifted arbitrarily by the same offset, e.g. so that the earliest event takes place at time 0,
t0 = 0. Hence, the generative model must draw the number K of events belonging to the intrusion,
0 ≤ K ≤ N , and then generate N −K + 2 events from the renewal process, starting with an event
at time 0 (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Generative model of an intrusion in a renewal process
1: K ∼ Binomial(N, p)
2: t0 ← 0
3: for i = 1 to N −K do
4: ∆ti ∼ F (θF )
5: ti ← ti−1 + ∆ti
6: end for
7: ∆tN−K+1 ∼ F (θF )
8: tN−K+1 ← tN−K + ∆tN−K+1
The model implies that the renewal process is fully known. Section 6 discusses ways to estimate the
process parameter θF .
5 Posterior Inference
In what follows, f(·) stands for the probability density of distribution F , P˜r(·) stands for unnormal-
ized probability. For brevity, we drop explicit conditioning of probabilities on problem parameters.
The proofs are provided in the supplementary material.
5.1 Probability of Intrusion Subsequence
The posterior inference in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 involves computing the unnormalized probability
of intrusion subsequence I given S.
Lemma 1. Let {k1, k2, . . . , kN−K} be the indices of events in S \ I , as produced by Algorithm 1
(for N = K, let us set k1 = N + 1, kN−K = k0 = 0). Then (see Figure 1),
P˜r(I|S) = Pk1
N−K−1∏
j=1
Qkj ,kj+1RkN−K , (3)
where
Pk = E
τ∼F
[f(τ)]
−1 ·

pN
∫∞
T
(τ−T )f(τ)2dτ∫∞
T
(τ−T )f(τ)dτ if k = N + 1,
pk−1
∫∞
tk−ts
f(τ)2dτ∫∞
tk−ts
f(τ)dτ
otherwise.
Qk1,k2 = E
τ∼F
[f(τ)]
−1 · (1− p)pk2−k1−1 f(tk2 − tk1),
Rk = E
τ∼F
[f(τ)]
−1 ·
Eτ∼F [f(τ)] if k = 0,(1− p)pN−k ∫∞te−tk f(τ)2dτ∫∞
te−tk
f(τ)dτ
otherwise.
Factors Pk, Qk1,k2, and Rk (Figure 1) correspond to transitions in the generative model (Algo-
rithm 1)
• from the extra event at the beginning to the first event in S \ I ,
• between events within S \ I , and
• from the last event in S \ I to the extra event at the end.
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Figure 1: The probability of an intrusion subsequence. Process events (S \ I) are black, intrusion events (I)
are red, extra events at the beginning and at the end are gray and dashed.
5.2 Maximum a Posteriori Subsequence
In (3) each of factors Pk, Qk1,k2 , Rk (Equation 3) is independent of the rest of events given two ad-
jacent process events. Therefore, finding a MAP subsequence of intrusion events can be formulated
as the shortest path problem in a directed acyclic graph.
Theorem 1. Let us construct a weighted directed acyclic graphG = (V,E) where the set of vertices
V is the set of events {e0, e1, · · · , eN+1}, and the set of edges E contains a weighted edge for each
pair of vertices, from the smaller to the greater index: {(ek1 , ek2), wk1,k2 | k2 > k1}. The edge
weights wk1,k2 are:
wk1,k2 =

− logPk2 if k1 = 0,
− logRk1 if k2 = N + 1,
− logQk1,k2 otherwise.
(4)
Then, a MAP subsequence of events IMAP is the set of events in a shortest path from e0 to eN+1
with the extra events {e0, eN+1} removed.
Theorem 1 implies that a MAP subsequence can be computed in time Θ(N2).
5.3 Intrusion Probabilities
The probability of an intrusion Pr(I 6= ∅|S) and the marginal probability Pr(ek ∈ I|S) of each
event ek, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, to belong to the intrusion can be computed in polynomial time. We first
present an algorithm for computing the posterior probability of intrusion. Then, we show how the
same algorithm can be generalized to also compute the marginal probability of any given event to
belong to the intrusion. Finally, we introduce an algorithm for computing simultaneously, and hence
more efficiently, the probability of an intrusion and the marginal probability of each event in S to
belong to the intrusion.
The algorithms compute the probabilities according to (5) and (6):
Pr(I 6= ∅|S) =1−Pr(I = ∅|S)=1− P˜r(I = ∅|S)
P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S)
(5)
Pr(ek∈I|S) =1−Pr(ek /∈I|S)=1− P˜r(ek /∈I|S)
P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S)
(6)
Both equations involve computing the unnormalized marginal likelihood P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S). Lemma 2
gives an algorithm for computing P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S) in polynomial time.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 computes P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S) in time Θ(N2).
Algorithm 2: Marginal likelihood of S
1: k ← 1
2: for k = 1 to N do
3: ak ← Pk
4: for j = 1 to k − 1 do
5: ak ← ak + ajQj,k
6: end for
7: end for
8: A← PN+1
9: for j = 1 to N do
10: A← A+ ajRj
11: end for
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12: return A
Being able to compute the unnormalized marginal likelihood, we can immediately obtain the intru-
sion probability (5). Marginal probabilities (6) involve the unnormalized probability of a particular
event ek∗ not in I given S, which can be computed similarly to the unnormalized marginal likeli-
hood. However, much of the computation would be reused between different marginal probabilities;
in particular, the computations for two events ek1 , ek2 are the same until min(k1, k2). Theorem 2
gives an algorithm1 that computes the intrusion probability and all posterior probabilities simulta-
neously, reusing computations.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 computes Pr(I 6= ∅|S) and Pr(ek ∈ I|S) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} in time
Θ(N2).
Algorithm 3: Intrusion probability and marginal probabilities of events
1: -- Run Algorithm 2 forward
2: P˜r(I ∈ 2S |S)← Algorithm 2
3: -- Compute the intrusion probability
4: P˜r(I = ∅|S)← Equation 3 where I = ∅
5: Pr(I 6= ∅|S) = 1− P˜r(I=∅|S)
P˜r(I∈2S |S)
6: for k = 1 to N do
7: afk ← ak -- Store ai from the forward run
8: end for
9: -- Compute S′, t′s, t
′
e by reversing the time
10: t′s, t
′
e = −te,−ts
11: for k = 1 to N do
12: t′k, y
′
k = −tN−k+1, yN−k+1
13: end for
14: -- Run Algorithm 2 backward
15: Algorithm 2 where S = S′, ts = t′s, te = t′e
16: for k = 1 to N do
17: abN−k+1 ← ak -- Store ai from the backward run
18: end for
19: -- Compute marginal probabilities
20: for k = 1 to N do
21: P˜r(ek /∈ I|S) = a
f
ka
b
k
1−p
22: Pr(ek ∈ I|S) = 1− P˜r(ek /∈I|S)
P˜r(I∈2S |S)
23: end for
24: return Pr(I 6= ∅|S), Pr(ek ∈ I|S)∀k
6 Process Parameters
The results in Section 5 rely on the process parameters being known. Subsections 6.1–6.3 discuss
ways in which the parameters can be estimated.
6.1 Estimation from Past Data
The most straightforward approach is to estimate the parameters from the past data under the as-
sumption that the data do not contain any intrusions. This assumption is adequate either if intrusions
are detected and removed from the data, or if they are rare, such that their influence on estimation of
the process parameters is negligible.
6.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation by Expectation-Maximization
The process parameters can be chosen to maximize the likelihood of the MAP subsequence. This
yields an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Algorithm 4) alternating between finding the
MAP subsequence IMAP of intrusion events and estimating parameters from the remaining subse-
quence S \ IMAP .
1Algorithm 3 bears similarity to the forward-backward algorithm for Markov chains [1], but computes
marginal probabilities of occurrence of a node in the sequence rather than of states in the sequence of nodes.
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Algorithm 4: Estimating process parameters by expectation-maximization
1: IprevMAP ← ∅ , i← 1
2: loop
3: M step: estimate θF , θG from S \ IprevMAP
4: if i = Niter then
5: break
6: end if
7: E step: compute IMAP
8: if IMAP = IprevMAP then
9: break
10: else if |IMAP | > Kmax then
11: break
12: end if
13: IprevMAP ← IMAP , i← i+ 1
14: end loop
15: return θF , θG
The initial parameter values are set under the assumption that there is no intrusion, i.e. from the
whole sequence S (line 1). Given a sequence of events, the parameters are estimated as in Sub-
section 6.1 (line 3). The algorithm terminates either when IMAP stays the same in two subsequent
iterations (line 9), thus reaching a fixed point, or after a pre-defined maximum number of iterations
Niter (line 5).
A pitfall of this EM scheme is that the process parameters cannot be estimated reliably if S \ IMAP
becomes too small. Hence, the algorithm must also be interrupted when the size of IMAP exceeds a
certain threshold Kmax (line 11).
There is no general guarantee that an EM algorithm converges to the global maximum [21]. In
practice, however, Algorithm 4 works well for sufficiently small values of p (see Section 7 for
empirical evidence), which is often the case in intrusion detection applications.
6.3 Bayesian Inference of Posterior Distribution of Parameters
In the Bayesian setting, a prior can be imposed upon the process parameters. The posterior infer-
ence is performed on the joint distribution of the process parameters conditioned on the marginal
likelihood of S (Algorithm 2). A drawback of this approach is that the inference may be too expen-
sive computationally. As the problem of detecting intrusions in online event streams often arises in
settings that require fast response, maximum-likelihood estimation from past data (Subsection 6.1)
or from the given event sequence (Subsection 6.2) may be a better choice.
7 Empirical Evaluation
In the case studies that follow we evaluate the algorithms of Sections 5 and 6 on both synthetic
and real-world data. Evaluation on synthetic data provides an evidence that the algorithms work
on data generated by a renewal process. Evaluation on real-world data examines performance of
the algorithms when the properties of the generating process are unknown, as well as assesses their
applicability to practical intrusion detection.
The data, the algorithms, and the code to run the experiments are available at https://github.com/
dtolpin/rmi-case-studies.
7.1 Evaluation on Synthetic Data
We generate data from a renewal process with Gamma-distributed interarrival intervals for shapes 1,
2, 4, and 8. The dataset is balanced so that a half of the dataset entries contains an intrusion. Intrusion
events are uniformly distributed over a subinterval of each entry with intrusion, chosen uniformly
with average length of 13 of the total entry duration. 10 000 entries of 20 events are generated for
each intrusion probability.
Figure 2 shows average posterior intrusion probability as a function of the shape of interval distri-
bution for both negative and positive entries. The probability is computed either for known process
parameters, or for parameters estimated through the EM algorithm (Section 6.2). The posterior in-
trusion probability for positive and negative samples differs sufficiently for shapes greater than 1 to
reliably distinguish between samples with and without intrusion in both.
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Figure 2: Posterior intrusion probability. The error bars are for two standard deviations.
Shape 1 corresponds to the Poisson process. In a Poisson process the joint density of a sequence of
events is independent of intermediate intervals given the interval between the last and the first event.
Hence, intrusion probabilities in positive and negative samples are close to 0.5 and to each other.
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Figure 3: Per-entry area under the ROC curve of intrusion.
Figure 3 shows area under the ROC curve (AUC) as a function of the prior intrusion probability
for each combination of data and algorithm parameters. AUC reflects the classification accuracy
for all combinations of false negative and false positive rates. When interarrival intervals are used
for intrusion detection, for both known process parameters and parameters estimated by the EM
algorithm, AUC stays above 0.6 for shapes greater than 1, with the highest values of ≈ 0.9.
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Figure 4: Jaccard similarity score.
Figure 4 shows average Jaccard similarity score between the MAP intrusion subsequence (Sec-
tion 5.2) and the actual intrusion. Jackard similarity score stays above ≈ 0.5 for shapes greater
than 1. The score is low for shape 1, because the Poisson process implies that in the presence of an
intrusion any subsequence of intermediate events of given size has the same probability to belong to
the intrusion.
7.2 Evaluation on Anonymized Real-World Data
We obtained anonymized data from an online payment system, consisting of 1000 log fragments.
The data contains time stamps and amounts of payments. The data is anonymized in the following
way. Each entry (log fragment) contains 50 events. The event times are rescaled so that the events
fall within interval [0, 1]. The payment amounts are normalized to have the mean of 1.
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The renewal process model of intrusion is straightforwardly extended to a renewal process with
independent marks by multiplying each term in (1) by the corresponding mark density. We evaluate
intrusion detection based on intervals alone, marks alone as a baseline, and marks and intervals
combined.
Neither parameters of normal processes generating the events nor the prior intrusion probability are
known. To estimate the prior intrusion probability, we split the dataset into the training (20%) and
test (80%) datasets. We choose the probability to maximize AUC on the training dataset, and then
run the inference on the training dataset. For both training and test dataset, we estimate process
parameters with the EM algorithm (Section 6.2).
Intervals Marks Marks and intervals
AUC 0.691 0.584 0.733
Jaccard score 0.686 0.532 0.725
Table 1: Metrics of intrusion detection in anonymized payment data. Marks only yield much lower accuracy
than either intervals and marks or intervals only.
Intrusion detection metrics on the test dataset are shown in Table 1. Detection based on marks only
serves as a comparison baseline. While marks alone provide some information about intrusion, the
detection accuracy is much higher when interarrival intervals are taken into account through the
renewal process model.
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Figure 5: The ROC curve of intrusion detection in anonymized payment data.
Figure 5 shows the ROC curves of intrusion detection on the test dataset. According to the curves,
when the renewal process is used for detection, ≈ 70% of entries with intrusion are among ≈
30% topmost entries ordered by posterior intrusion probability. ≈ 80% of intrusion events are
among≈ 10% topmost events ordered by posterior marginal probability of belonging to an intrusion.
Compared to that, when the detection is based on marks alone, the intrusion detection accuracy is
only slightly better than random guess.
8 Discussion
We introduced a probabilistic generative model for inference about intrusions in renewal processes.
Posterior inference in this model can be performed in polynomial time to obtain the posterior in-
trusion probability, the marginal probability of each event to belong to an intrusion, and a MAP
subsequence of intrusion events. When process parameters are unknown, they can be efficiently
estimated using an expectation-maximization algorithm.
We evaluated the inference algorithms, including parameter estimation, on both synthetic and
anonymized real-world data. In both cases the inference algorithms yielded results suggesting their
suitability for intrusion detection. Due to low runtime complexity, the algorithms suit well online
applications, such as fraud detection in online payment systems.
Application of the algorithms is based on the assumption that the process generating normal events
is sufficiently well described by a renewal process. Evaluation on the anonymized real-world data
from an online payment system supports feasibility of this model. However, one may envision cases
where renewal process is inadequate, such that when multiple past events affect the distribution
of future event times and marks. In such cases, a model based on interacting point processes, in
particular on the Hawkes process, should be considered; however, exact or approximate inference
algorithms in such a model may have higher computational complexity. On the other hand, if the
event series are well described by a Poisson process, intrusions cannot be reliably identified based
on interarrival intervals.
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9 PROOFS
Lemma 1
Proof. To define Pr(I|S) for any I ⊂ S on the same reference probability measure, we extend S by
K unboserved non-intrusion events S so that S ◦ S contains exactly N non-intrusion events. Since
intervals are mutually independent, the expected joint probability density of the unobserved events
is the product of expected probability densities of each interval:
E(P˜r(S)) = E
τ∼F
[f(τ)]K (7)
P˜r(I|S) is computed as the product of probability densities of each transition in S\I and of expected
joint probability density of the unobserved events:
P˜r(I|S) = P ′k1
N−K−1∏
j=1
Q′kj ,kj+1R
′
kN−K E(P˜r(S)), (8)
where
Pk = ·

pN
∫∞
T
(τ−T )f(τ)2dτ∫∞
T
(τ−T )f(τ)dτ if k = N + 1,
pk−1
∫∞
tk−ts
f(τ)2dτ∫∞
tk−ts
f(τ)dτ
otherwise.
Qk1,k2 = ·(1− p)pk2−k1−1 f(tk2 − tk1),
Rk = ·
1 if k = 0,(1− p)pN−k ∫∞te−tk f(τ)2dτ∫∞
te−tk
f(τ)dτ
otherwise.
Here, PN+1 accounts for the case when all events in S are intrusion events. The probability density
of a randomly chosen interarrival interval of duration ∆t is Eτ∼F [τ ]−1∆tf(∆t) (known as ‘ob-
servation paradox’ [5]). The probability density of an interarrival interval of duration ∆t covering
[ts, te] is ∝ (∆t − T )f(∆t)2 for ∆t >= T , 0 otherwise. Pk and Rk for k ∈ {1, . . . , N} account
for intervals from first and last events in S to the corresponding extra events. Qk1,k2 account for
intervals between events in S.
P˜r(I|S) is unnormalized, hence can be scaled by any factor that does not depend on I or S. Equation
(3) is obtained as
P˜r(I|S)← P˜r(I|S)
Eτ∼F [f(τ)]N+1
(9)
Theorem 1
Proof. According to (3),
− log P˜r(I|S) = w0,k1 +
N−K−1∑
j=1
wkj ,kj+1 + wkN−k,N+1 (10)
which is also the length of a path from e0 to eN+1. log(·) is monotonically increasing, hence
minimizing (10) computes IMAP through maximizing the posterior probability P˜r(I|S).
Corollary 1. Provided that the probability density of F (θF ) can be computed in fixed time, a MAP
subsequence of intrusion events can be computed in time Θ(N2).
Proof. Constructing GI requires Θ(N2) for computing the edge weights according to (4). The
shortest path between two vertices in a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) can be computed in
Θ(|V | + |E|) time [4, Section 24.2]. In GI , |VI | = N + 2, |EI | = |VI |(|VI |−1)2 , hence a shortest
path in GI can be found in Θ(N2). Hence, the total computation time of IMAP is Θ(N2).
Lemma 2
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Proof. The proof uses similar reasoning to the proof of Lemma 1. Any event ek belonging to the
process can be reached from any event ej preceding it, 0 ≤ j < k. Line 3 accounts for transitions
from the extra event at the beginning to ek. Line 5 — for transitions from earlier events in S \ I
to ek. ak, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are the marginal likelihoods of subsequences S1:k over time intervals
[ts, tk]. Similarly, lines 8–11 account for transitions from any event to the extra event at the end. A
is the marginal likelihood of S over time interval [ts, te].
The running time is dominated by the nested loop in lines 2–7. Line 5 in the loop is executed
N(N−1)
2 times. Hence, the algorithm runs in time Θ(N
2).
Theorem 2
Proof. A renewal process is a Markov process: the arrival time of an event is independent of earlier
events given the last event. Consequently, the likelihood of a sequence stays the same if the times
of events and the interval bounds are reversed. Therefore, afk , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are the marginal
likelihoods of subsequences S1:k over time intervals [ts, tk], and abk are the marginal likelihoods of
Sk:N+1 over [tk, te]. The loop in lines 20–23 computes the marginal probabilities of events in S to
belong to the intrusion. Line 21 computes the probability of S with ek /∈ I by multiplying afk and
abk and dividing by the probability of ek /∈ I independently of other events, because this probability
appears twice, both in afk and in a
b
k. The expressions for returned values in lines 5 and 22 are due to
(5) and (6).
Algorithm 2 runs in time Θ(N2) and is called twice. The rest of the algorithm runs in time Θ(N).
Hence, the algorithm runs in time Θ(N2).
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